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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After a jury trial, Tory Jonathon Marshall was found guilty of one count of aiding and
abetting burglary, and one count of aiding and abetting grand theft. For the respective charges,
the district court imposed consecutive sentences of ten years, with three years fixed, and five
years, with zero years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. Mr. Marshall appeals from the district
court's judgment of conviction and argues that the district court abused its discretion when it
failed to redline erroneous information in the Presentence Report, and when it imposed excessive
underlying sentences.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In November of 2017, a deputy at the Canyon County Detention Center "noticed a folded
property release form wedged through the side" of a door. (Presentence Report, (PSI), p.4.) 1
She then asked an inmate about the form because his name was on it. (PSI, p.4.) He said he did
not fill out the form, so the deputy requested to view video surveillance to determine who
completed it. (PSI, p.4.) That video showed that Mr. Marshall had filled out the form and
placed it in the door. (PSI, p.4.) The following day, another deputy spoke with an inmate about
a property release form with his name on it, and the inmate said he did not fill out the form.
(PSI, p.4.)
When the deputies investigated the issue further, they discovered that a woman named
Paula Rush had picked up the property of two other inmates. (PSI, p.4.) When they interviewed
Mr. Marshall, he said he knew Ms. Rush, but he denied he filled out the property release forms.
(PSI, p.5.) The deputies then spoke with another inmate who alleged that Mr. Marshall told him
1

All citations to the PSI refer to the 46-page electronic document.
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to change his property release form to release his property to Ms. Rush.

(PSI, p.5.)

Subsequently, Mr. Marshall contacted Ms. Rush and told her there was an investigation at the
jail, and she should deactivate her account.

(PSI, p.5.)

The following day, Mr. Marshall

contacted Ms. Rush again and told her to bring one inmate's property back to the jail. (PSI, p.5.)
Subsequently, the State charged Mr. Marshall with two counts of burglary and two counts
of grand theft. (R., pp.41-43.) Mr. Marshall proceeded to trial and was found guilty of one
count of aiding and abetting burglary, and one count of aiding and abetting grand theft.
(R., pp.136-38.) At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel pointed out that the PSI contained
erroneous information as it listed four victims in this case, but there was actually only one.
(Tr., p.266, L.18 - p.267, L.6.) Nevertheless, the PSI contained in the appellate record contains
no redlining of that erroneous information. (See PSI, p.5.) For the respective convictions, the
district court imposed consecutive sentences of ten years, with three years fixed, and five years,
with zero years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. 2 (R., pp.159-60.) Mr. Marshall filed a notice of
appeal timely from the district court's judgment of conviction. (R., pp.161-63.)

2

While this case has been on appeal, Mr. Marshall successfully completed his rider, and the
district court suspended his sentence and placed him on probation for four years.
2

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to redline the part of the PSI that
defense counsel pointed out was erroneous?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it retained jurisdiction, but imposed
consecutive underlying sentences often years, with three years fixed, and five years, with
zero years fixed, following Mr. Marshall's convictions for one count of aiding and
abetting burglary, and one count of aiding and abetting grand theft?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Redline The Part Of The PSI That
Defense Counsel Pointed Out Was Erroneous
When the district court asked if there were corrections to the PSI, defense counsel
specifically referenced the fact that page 5 of the PSI listed four victims in this case, but this was
erroneous information because there was only one victim - Augustine Amaral. (Tr., p.266, L.18
- p.267, L.6; R., p.125; PSI, p.5.) However, the district court did not redline that page of the
PSI.
"A district court's denial of a motion to strike or delete portions of a PSI is reviewed on
appeal for an abuse of discretion." State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 961 (Ct. App. 2010). A
district court abuses its discretion when: (1) it fails to recognize the issue as one of discretion;
(2) it acts beyond the outer bounds of its discretion; (3) it acts inconsistently with the applicable
legal standards, or (4) it reaches its decision without exercising reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun
Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018). In Molen, the Court of Appeals addressed a similar situation

to this one and held that, while the district court correctly refused to consider the unreliable
information, it still committed reversible error by not striking that information from the PSI. 148
Idaho at 961. Therefore, the court remanded the case so the district court could strike unreliable
information from the PSI and "send a corrected copy to the Department of Correction." Id. at
962; see also State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 183 (1991). (remanding the case so that a corrected
PSI could be obtained).
The reason that erroneous information needs to be stricken from the PSI is that "the use
of a PSI does not end with the defendant's sentencing. The report goes to the Department of
Correction[] and may be considered by the Commission of Pardons and Parole in evaluating the
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defendant's suitability for parole. In addition, if the defendant reoffends, any prior PSI is usually
presented to the sentencing court with an updated report from the presentence investigator."

State v. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 261, 262 n.1 (Ct. App. 1998). Moreover, "the timeframe for
alterations of the report is explicitly tied to the sentencing hearing; it is at the sentencing
hearing-and not beyond-that the defendant is given the opportunity to object to its contents."

State v. Person, 145 Idaho 293, 296 (Ct. App. 2007). That means "a district court's authority to
change the contents of a PSI ceases once a judgment of conviction and sentence are issued." Id.
Therefore, this one and only opportunity to correct the PSI needs to be employed, since "a PSI
follows a defendant indefinitely, and information inappropriate included therein may prejudice
the defendant even if the initial sentencing court disregarded such information." Rodriguez, 132
Idaho at 262 n.1.
This rule does not mean that the district court is required to redline every point which a
defendant challenges. See, e.g., State v. Carey, 152 Idaho 720, 722 (Ct. App. 2012). It does,
however, mean that, ''where the trial court was rejecting information in the PSI as unfounded or
unreliable, it is insufficient to simply disregard the information at sentencing and, instead, the
court should also redline it from the PSI so that this information could not prejudice the
defendant in the future." Id.
In this case, it is clear the district court was aware of the problem as it presided over the
trial, and confirmed that it understood this was the only correction requested. (Tr., p.267, Ls.4-9,
p.273, Ls.22-25.) Thus, the issue was clearly argued to the district court and is preserved for
appeal. See State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998) (citation omitted) (noting that when an
issue was "argued to or decided by the trial court," it may be raised for the first time on appeal).
Despite this, however, for some reason the district court neglected to redline the PSI. As such, it

5

did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards. Therefore, as in Molen and Mauro,
this case should be remanded so that Mr. Marshall's PSI can be corrected.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Retained Jurisdiction, But Imposed
Consecutive Underlying Sentences Of Ten Years, With Three Years Fixed, And Five Years,
With Zero Years Fixed, Following Mr. Marshall's Convictions For One Count Of Aiding And
Abetting Burglary, And One Count Of Aiding And Abetting Grand Theft
Given the facts of this case, Mr. Marshall's underlying consecutive sentences of ten
years, with three years fixed, and five years, with zero years fixed, are excessive because they are
not necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing. When there is a claim that the sentencing court
imposed an excessive sentence, this Court will conduct "an independent review of the record,
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection
of the public interest." State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8 (2016). In such a review, the Court
"considers the entire length of the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard." Id. An
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry when an exercise of discretion is reviewed on
appeal. It considers whether the trial court "(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the
exercise ofreason." Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
"When a trial court exercises its discretion in sentencing, 'the most fundamental
requirement is reasonableness."' McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8 (quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho
606, 608 (1991)). Unless it appears that the length of the sentence is "necessary to accomplish
the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution," the sentence is unreasonable. Id. When a sentence is
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excessive "considering any view of the facts," because it is not necessary to achieve these goals,
it is unreasonable and therefore an abuse of discretion. Id.
There are several mitigating factors that illustrate why Mr. Marshall's underlying
sentences are excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. First, Mr. Marshall endured a
difficult childhood. He explained that his parents divorced when he was only an infant, he
started using drugs when he was 14, and he was told to leave his family home when he was only
16 because he had a physical fight with his stepfather. (PSI, p.14.) A defendant's difficult
childhood has long been recognized as a mitigating factor. See State v. Gonzales, 123 Idaho 92,
93-94 (Ct. App. 1993).
Additionally, Mr. Marshall suffers with mental health problems such as an AttentionDeficit/Hyperactivity disorder, and a Stimulant Use Disorder. (PSI, p.39.) He has also been
provisionally diagnosed with a Posttraumatic Stress disorder or Acute Stress Disorder, a Major
Depressive Disorder, and a Generalized Anxiety Disorder. (PSI, p.39.) Mental health problems
such as this should also be considered as mitigating information. State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho
384, 391 (1994) ("Idaho Code § 19-2523, which requires that the trial court consider the
defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor, was an integral part of the legislature's repeal of
mental condition as a defense.").
Despite these problems, Mr. Marshall has excelled at his work. Indeed, the owner of a
construction company spoke on his behalf at the sentencing hearing and said that Mr. Marshall
had been a great asset to his company. Specifically, he said that Mr. Marshall worked long
hours, six days a week, and "without him, [his] business [was] going to take a huge hit."
(Tr., p.271, Ls.2-14.) He also commented that he and his family all trusted Mr. Marshall in their
home, and he believed that Mr. Marshall's wife and child were "the two most important things to
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him in the world." (Tr., p.270, Ls.7-25.) Additionally, he explained that Mr. Marshall had
helped to make his new company profitable; in fact, he said the company was "no longer hurting
for work," and that was due in large part to Mr. Marshall's commitment to the company and hard
work.

(Tr., p.269, Ls.8-20.)

This kind of work history should also be considered as an

additional mitigating factor. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982) (reducing sentence of
defendant who, inter alia, had been steadily employed, enjoyed his work, and expressed a desire
to advance within his company).
His recent commitment to improving his life, and that ofhis family, was also documented
by a counselor with Easter Seals Goodwill. (PSI, p.43.) She wrote that Mr. Marshall had been
participating in treatment beginning in December of 2018, and he had "made great efforts to
maintain employment and treatment, [had] kept in good communication with treatment staff, and
participate[d] well in individual and group settings." (PSI, p.43.) She went on to explain that
Mr. Marshall had openly discussed his prior crimes, and had gone to "great lengths" to stay away
from the gang lifestyle. (PSI, p.43.) This included getting tattoos removed, and he said he was
taking these steps "for his protection and the protection of his family, and for personal selfworth."

(PSI, p.43.)

The counselor concluded her letter by stating that Mr. Marshall's

"transparency, integrity, and honesty are a true dedication to his commitment to a different and
better life for him and his family." (PSI, p.43.)
Mr. Marshall asserts the district court failed to adequately consider all of this mitigating
information when it imposed his underlying sentences. Indeed, this information showed that
Mr. Marshall had changed dramatically.

In light of Mr. Marshall's documented efforts to

improve himself through hard work and treatment, the district court failed to reach its decision to
impose what amounts to a fifteen-year underlying sentence through an exercise of reason.
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Mr. Marshall also asserts that shorter underlying sentences would still ensure the goals of
sentencing were met, and therefore his extended underlying sentences were not necessary.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Marshall respectfully requests that this Court remand this case so the erroneous
information can be stricken from the PSI. He also request that this Court reduce his underlying
sentences as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 18th day of February, 2020.

I sf Reed P. Anderson
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of February, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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